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Abstract
With the recent advances in solving large, zero-sum extensive
form games, there is a growing interest in the inverse problem
of inferring underlying game parameters given only access to
agent actions. Although a recent work provides a powerful
differentiable end-to-end learning frameworks which embed
a game solver within a deep-learning framework, allowing
unknown game parameters to be learned via backpropagation,
this framework faces significant limitations when applied to
boundedly rational human agents and large scale problems,
leading to poor practicality. In this paper, we address these
limitations and propose a framework that is applicable for
more practical settings. First, seeking to learn the rational-
ity of human agents in complex two-player zero-sum games,
we draw upon well-known ideas in decision theory to ob-
tain a concise and interpretable agent behavior model, and
derive solvers and gradients for end-to-end learning. Second,
to scale up to large, real-world scenarios, we propose an effi-
cient first-order primal-dual method which exploits the struc-
ture of extensive-form games, yielding significantly faster
computation for both game solving and gradient computa-
tion. When tested on randomly generated games, we report
speedups of orders of magnitude over previous approaches.
We also demonstrate the effectiveness of our model on both
real-world one-player settings and synthetic data.
1 Introduction
Game theory has traditionally been centered around find-
ing players’ strategies in equilibrium. In recent years, there
has been growing interest in the inverse setting of learn-
ing game parameters from observed player actions (Vorob-
eychik, Wellman, and Singh 2007; Blum, Haghtalab, and
Procaccia 2014; Waugh, Ziebart, and Bagnell 2011). Recent
work by Ling, Fang, and Kolter (2018) tackle this problem
in the zero-sum setting by providing an end-to-end learning
framework to learn game parameters such as payoff matri-
ces and chance node probability distributions assuming the
actions are sampled from the Quantal Response equilibrium.
At the core of the framework is a differentiable game solving
module.
However, their proposed method suffers from two major
flaws. Firstly, the assumption that players behave in accor-
dance to the QRE severely limits the space of player strate-
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gies, and is known to exhibit pathological behavior even in
one-player settings. Second, their solvers are computation-
ally inefficient and are unable to scale.
Our work addresses these deficiencies in two ways. First,
we propose the Nested Logit Quantal Response equilibrium
(NLQRE), which draws upon ideas from from behavioral
science and allows for varying levels of player rationality at
each stage of the game. We show that the NLQRE is strictly
more general than the models considered by Ling, Fang,
and Kolter, and may not be replicated by a straightforward
scaling of payoff matrices. We derive the required gradients
and show that player rationality can be learned via gradient
descent can be learned using the same end-to-end learning
framework. Second, we substantially reduce training time by
reformulating the backward pass as a min-max convex opti-
mization problem and uses state-of-the-art first order primal-
dual methods for both the forward pass and backward pass.
Unlike previous work, which relied on second-order meth-
ods, our first-order solver does not require explicit formation
of Hessians and only requires access to a fast best-response
oracle. In our evaluation with random payoff matrices and
one-card poker, we report orders of magnitude of speedups.
Lastly, we evaluate the NLQRE on real-world data in an
one-player information gathering game and provide quali-
tative insights. In total, we believe that our work is a signif-
icant step towards the practical learning of human behavior
in zero-sum settings.
2 Background and related work
Although much less well studied than traditional equilib-
rium finding, there are several approaches aimed at the task
of learning games in the setting where underlying game pay-
offs are unknown. These include methods which rely on spe-
cific game structure such as symmetry (Vorobeychik, Well-
man, and Singh 2007), operate in an active setting (Blum,
Haghtalab, and Procaccia 2014), or focus primarily on nor-
mal form games and straightforward linear settings (Waugh,
Ziebart, and Bagnell 2011). Ling, Fang, and Kolter (2018)
provide an alternative framework which embeds a differ-
entiable game solver within another gradient based learner
(e.g., a deep network), as illustrated in Figure 1. This enables
game parameters to be learned via simple gradient descent.
We now describe their framework briefly.
Suppose PΦ(x) is the zero-sum payoff matrix given some
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Figure 1: The framework used by Ling, Fang, and Kolter
features x and game parameters Φ which we wish to learn.
The game solver takes in PΦ(x) and outputs the QRE (u, v),
which correspond to mixed strategies of the min and max
player. During training, the log loss L(a, u, v) of the solver’s
predicted strategies is computed against observed actions a.
The game parameters Φ are then optimized by minimizing
L. This is performed by propagating gradients backwards
through the game solver and performing gradient descent,
where the required gradients for the backward pass are read-
ily derived by using the implicit function theorem. The train-
ing phase is summarized in Algorithm 1. We will now touch
on two key ideas from decision and game theory, which will
eventually culminate in the proposed NLQRE.
Algorithm 1: Learning game parameters Φ using SGD
Input: training data {(x(i), a(i))}, learning rate η, Φinit
for ep in {0, . . . , epmax} do
Sample (x(i), a(i)) from training data;
Forward pass: Compute PΦ(x(i)), QRE (u, v) and
loss L(a(i), u, v);
Backward pass: Compute gradients
∇uL,∇vL,∇PL,∇ΦL;
Update parameters: Φ← Φ− η∇ΦL;
end
2.1 Nested-logit choice models
One of the fundamental research problems in behavioral sci-
ence is to mathematically model seemingly irrational (or
non-utility maximizing) human behavior. Among the most
important models is the class of the random utility mod-
els (RUM) (Thurstone 1927). The Logit model1 is the most
notable RUM, where given a set of alternatives A each
with (known) utility Ua, the probability that alternative a is
picked is u∗a =
exp(Ua)∑
a′∈A exp(Ua′ )
. It is equivalent to the prob-
ability that alternative a has highest utility under Gumbel
noise, i.e., u∗a = P (arg maxa′(Ua′ + a′) = a), where a′
are i.i.d. Gumbel distributed.
However, the logit model suffers from limitations. This
includes classic ‘red and blue bus’ pathologies2 (Luce 2012)
1Logits are more commonly known by the machine learning
community as the ‘softmax’ operator.
2Suppose there are 3 alternatives for transport – a red bus, a
blue bus, and a car. The player derives the same utility for each
alternative, xcar = xred = xblue. Applying the logit model gives an
equal probability of choosing each vehicle. One would however,
expect the car to be taken with probability 1/2 and each bus to be
which restrict the class of behaviors permitted. Specifically,
logit models obey the property of independence of irrelevant
alternatives, which does not take into account cases when
alternatives are ‘qualitatively’ similar.
Nested-logit (NL) models (Train 2009) address this lim-
itation by grouping fundamentally similar alternatives to-
gether and allows for correlations between ’s belonging to
the same group. In a two-level NL model, A is divided into
K disjoint clusters, with alternatives a belonging to cluster
k(a) chosen with probability
u∗a ∝ exp
(
Ua/λk(a)
) ∑
a′∈k(a)
exp
(
Ua′/λk(a)
)λk(a)−1 ,
where λ’s are parameters governing noise correlation. These
probabilities may be interpreted as a two-stage decision
making process: in the first stage, a cluster is chosen, and
in the second stage, the specific action is selected based on
(scaled) softmax on Ua within the cluster. The probability of
choosing each cluster in the first stage is given by the soft-
max over the (scaled) log-sum-exp of each cluster. When
λ = 1, the standard logit model is recovered, and when
λ → 0+, the ‘elimination by aspects’ is obtained (Tversky
1972). NL models can have multiple layers, leading to a NL
tree representing the nested grouping. The reader is directed
to the book by Train for background about nested logits and
their various interpretations.
2.2 Quantal response equilibria (QRE)
We now turn our attention to 2-player games. Seminal work
by McKelvey propose QRE as a noisy alternative to NE.
(McKelvey and Palfrey 1995). Similar to logit choice mod-
els, the QRE is the equilibrium obtained when payoffs are
perturbed by noise obeying a Gumbel distribution. Formally,
(u∗, v∗) is a QRE of a normal form game with action setsAu
and Av for the two players and payoff matrix P if
u∗a =
exp(−Pv∗/λ)a∑
a′∈Au
exp(−Pv∗/λ)a′ , v
∗
a =
exp(PTu∗/λ)a∑
a′∈Au
exp(PTu∗/λ)a′
,
where 1/λ is a parameter governing the level of agent ratio-
nality. Observe that as λ → ∞, players behave uniformly
at random, while (u∗, v∗) approaches a NE as λ → 0+.
For zero-sum games, it is further known (Mertikopoulos and
Sandholm 2016) that QRE is the unique solution of the fol-
lowing convex-concave program
min
u∈Rn
max
v∈Rm
uTPv + λ
∑
a
ua log ua − λ
∑
a
va log va
subject to 1Tu = 1, 1T v = 1.
For a two-player extensive form game characterized by a
game tree with information sets Iu and Iv for the min and
max player respectively, Ling, Fang, and Kolter show that
when λ = 1, the QRE in reduced normal form of the game is
chosen with probability 1/4, since the color of buses should have
no impact on decisions.
equivalent to the solution of the following regularized min-
max problem, where u and v are the players’ strategies in
sequence form (Von Stengel 1996).
min
u
max
v
uTPv +
∑
h∈Iu
∑
a∈Ah
ua log
ua
uph
−
∑
h∈Iv
∑
a∈Ah
va log
va
vph
subject to Eu = e, Fv = f (1)
In the above, P is the sequence form payoff matrix and E
and F are the sequence form constraint matrices. Ah de-
notes the possible actions at information set h, while ph is
the action (from the same player) preceding h. In the se-
quence form, one works with realization plans u, v as op-
posed to probability vectors. These realization plans repre-
sent probabilities of choosing a given sequence, while the
constraint matrices E,F are matrices containing {0, 1,−1}
and contain parent-child relationships in the game tree. The
sequence form is significantly more compact than the nor-
mal form while retaining virtually all of its strategic ele-
ments.
3 Nested-logit quantal response equilibria
Our proposed Nested-logit QRE (NLQRE) is a generaliza-
tion of both the QRE (in zero-sum games) and NL models.
That is, it generalizes NL models to two player zero-sum
games, or equivalently, extends the QRE by permitting a
more general nested logit structure. This allows us to model
a far wider range of player behaviors, and in particular, cases
where player rationality varies between stages of the game.
We assume that the grouping of actions within each infor-
mation set is known a-priori. The NLQRE is given by the
unique solution to the following optimization problem
min
u
max
v
uTPv +
∑
h∈Iu
λh
∑
a∈Ah
ua log
ua
uph
−
∑
h∈Iv
λh
∑
a∈Ah
va log
va
vph
subject to Eu = e, Fv = f. (2)
The NL model is recovered in a one-player setting (i.e., Pv
is a constant vector) and the QRE is recovered when there
is no nesting and λ’s are equal. Ling, Fang, and Kolter as-
sumes that all the λ’s are equal to 1 and focus on learning
entries of the payoff matrix P by exploiting the smoothness
of QRE solutions. This allows us to employ gradient-based
approaches (Amin, Singh, and Wellman 2016) for learning.
In this paper, we do not assume λ’s are known in our solution
concept and instead treat them as parameters to be learned.
The additional representation power brought by introduc-
ing λ’s to 1 cannot be achieved by a simple scaling of the
payoff matrix in the original formulation by Ling, Fang,
and Kolter, even in the non-nested, simultaneous move nor-
mal form settings. To see why this is so, consider the game
of symmetric rock-paper-scissors with non-uniform rewards
(i.e., the payoffs for winners depend on their specific action).
Suppose the game is played between ‘strong’ and ‘weak’
players, and this is reflected by low and high λ parameters
respectively. Due to differing λ’s for each player, the strate-
gies of the two players in equilibrium are different. However,
scaling P , or even changing individual payoffs for winners
(while maintaining symmetry) can only result in symmetric
equilibrium.
Remark 1. Readers familiar with nested logits may recall
that the most common form of nested logits do not admit
chance nodes (or in our 2-player setting, parallel informa-
tion sets). It may be shown that there is a natural way of
doing so by considering representing each alternative as a
pure strategy in the reduced normal form, and by nesting
each action based on the information sets which have a non-
zero probability of being reached. The details are presented
in the appendix.
Remark 2. The expression in (2) is fairly general. Broadly
speaking, our framework allows for 2 types of nesting. First
we allow for nesting via information sets (i.e., each informa-
tion set gets its own λ, see Remark 1), and second, by clus-
tering actions within an information set, which is achieved
by introducing intermediate information sets (e.g., the ‘red
and blue bus’ example). Our experiments in Section 5 focus
on the former. However (2) and our proposed solver is able
to handle the latter case, assuming that the nesting structure
is known a-priori.
Remark 3. The form of regularization is known as in (2)
is known as the dilated entropy regularization and the λ’s
may be interpreted as governing the degree of regulariza-
tion or smoothing. Its form was first introduced by Hoda
et al., and follow-up work by Kroer et al. provided specific
strong-convexity bounds on the regularizer. In particular, a
specific instantiation of λ’s results in a best-response prob-
lem which is 1-strongly convex. The authors exploit this fact
to yield some of the fastest solvers for Nash equilibria of two
player zero-sum extensive form games. Note however, that
their motivation is primarily computational in nature, as op-
posed to modelling, which is the case for us.
3.1 NLQRE solver
Following the ideas proposed by Ling, Fang, and Kolter,
we present a naive solver for the NLQRE based on
Newton’s method. Denote Ca and Ca′ as sets of possible
information sets immediately following a or a′. Define
Ja =
∑
h′∈Ca λh′ , and let ρa be the information set
immediately preceding the action a, i.e. h where a ∈ Ah.
The KKT conditions for (2) are, for all h′ ∈ Iv, a′ ∈ Ah′ ,
and for all h ∈ Iu, a ∈ Ah,
(Pv)a + λρa(1 + log
ua
uph
)− Ja +
∑
c∈Ca
µc − µh = 0
(PTu)a′ − λρa′ (1 + log
va′
vph′
) + Ja′ +
∑
c∈Ca′
νc − νh′ = 0
Eu− e = 0 Fv − f = 0. (3)
These are necessary and sufficient conditions for NLQRE,
implying that the NLQRE can be found by applying New-
ton’s method to (3), yielding the following updates
Ξ(u) P E 0
PT −Ξ(v) 0 F
ET 0 0 0
0 FT 0 0

∆u∆v∆µ
∆ν
 = −g(u, v, µ, ν), (4)
where Ξ(u)ab =

λρa+
∑
h′∈Ca λh′
ua
, a = b
−λρaub , pρa = b
−λρbua , pρb = a
, (5)
g(u, v, µ, ν) contains terms in (3) and Ξ(v) is defined anal-
ogously in terms of the appropriate v and λ’s. Observe
that Ξ(u) and Ξ(v) are diagonally dominant and symmet-
ric, implying that they are positive definite. In the back-
ward pass, we require the gradients of the loss L with re-
spect to P and λ. Similar to prior work (Gould et al. 2016;
Amos and Kolter 2017; Ling, Fang, and Kolter 2018), this
may be done by applying the implicit function theorem or
by simply manipulating differentials. This yields the gradi-
ents ∇PL = yuvT + uyTv ; ∇λhL = κTh yu for h ∈ Iu,
∇λhL = −KTh yv for h ∈ Iv , where
(κh)a =
{
1 + log(ua/upρa ), ρa = h
−1, h ∈ Ca (6)
(Kh)a =
{
1 + log(va/vpρa ), ρa = h
−1, h ∈ Ca (7)yuyvyµ
yν
 =

−Ξ(u) P E 0
PT Ξ(v) 0 F
ET 0 0 0
0 FT 0 0

−1 −∇uL−∇vL0
0
 . (8)
4 Fast forward and backward pass solvers
In the framework of Ling, Fang, and Kolter, each gradient
step in Algorithm 1 involves solving an optimization prob-
lem. Thus, having efficient solvers is crucial in scaling up. In
the naive solver, the forward pass is solved using Newton’s
method and we need to solve the system of linear equations
(5) in each iteration. When the game tree is large, solving
the system of linear equations in (5) multiple times dra-
matically slows down training. Similarly for the backward
pass, one needs to solve a single linear system shown in (8).
When the game is large, naively solving the linear system is
also prohibitively slow, even when utilizing sparse matrices.
This serves as motivation for a first-order iterative method
(FOM) which do not require the solution of a linear system
as a subroutine. FOMs are also computationally attractive
for solving extensive form games because of the underlying
tree structures in games which may be exploited. We will
focus on optimization problems in the following min-max
form.
min
Ex=x0
max
Fy=y0
xTPy + E(x)−F(y), (9)
where E(x) and F(y) are strictly convex functions. It is ob-
vious from (2) that the forward pass in our problem solves
a problem in this form. We will show later that the back-
ward pass problem shown in (8) can also be seen as solving
a problem in this format.
Many methods to solve (9) have been proposed. In this pa-
per, we adapt the method proposed by Chambolle and Pock
(2016)3. This, as well as many other first order methods ap-
ply best response subroutines towards smoothed versions of
the min or max original problem taken in isolation. The so-
lution is obtained by alternating between best-responses to
minimization and maximization. Algorithm 2 gives the high-
level overview of the optimization procedure, where BR are
smoothed best responses with appropriately chosen Breg-
man divergences Dx, Dy , their associated convex functions
Ψx,Ψy , and ‘step sizes’ τ, α.
BRx(x¯, y˜) = arg min
Ex=x0
xTP y˜ + E(x) + 1
τ
Dx(x, x¯)
BRy(y¯, x˜) = arg min
Fy=y0
−x˜TPy + F(y) + 1
σ
Dy(y, y¯).
We first set τ = σ for convenience. For Algorithm 2
to be practical, we will require the best response oracles
BRx,BRy to be computed efficiently. By setting Dx(x, x¯)
andDy(y, y¯) to be of specific form similar to E(x) andF(y)
respectively will simplify BRx and BRy to be (up to a factor)
of the forms
arg min
Ex=x0
xT cx + E(x) and arg min
Fy=y0
yT cy + F(y),
which are efficiently computed by exploiting the structure of
the problem in extensive form games. This avoids the need to
solve a linear system with P as part of the design matrix. The
remainder of this section outlines the procedures required
for both forward and backward passes. For brevity, we dis-
cuss this from the view of the minimization – the maximiza-
tion subroutine is entirely analogous. Lastly, we remark that
the computational advances in this section are independent
of the NLQRE, i.e., they remains applicable to the original
framework of Ling, Fang, and Kolter.
Algorithm 2: FOM method to solve (9)
Input: x(0), y(0), P, τ, σ
for i in {0, . . . } do
y˜ = y(i);
x(i+1) = BRx(x(i), y˜;P, τ);
x˜ = 2x(i+1) − x(i);
y(i+1) = BRy(y(i), x˜;P, σ);
end
Forward Pass For this section, the u = x, v = y when
referring Algorithm 2. Setting E(u),F(v) to be the entropy
terms in (2) and u0 = e, v0 = f gives the expression in
the form of (9). The natural divergence to be chosen is the
standard entropy divergence adapted to the dilated setting
3Note that the algorithm by Chambolle and Pock is more gen-
eral and applies beyond game solving.
(dropping terms in Du which do not contain u).
Ψu(u) = E(u) =
∑
h∈Iu
λh
∑
a∈Ah
ua log
ua
uph
Du(u, u¯) = Ψu(u)− uTΨ′u(u¯)
Ψ′u(u¯) = λρa −
∑
h′∈Ca
λh′ + λρa log
u¯a
u¯pa
where a similar expression holds forDv(v, v¯). Plugging into
the expression for BRu gives
BRu(u¯, v˜) = arg min
Eu=e
τ
1 + τ
uT (P v˜ + Ψ′u(u¯)) + E(u).
It is known that, BRu(u¯, v˜) may be solved by a single
bottom-up traversal of the game tree and a single sparse
matrix-vector multiplication (Hoda et al. 2010). At each in-
formation set , we solve for the ‘behavioral’ best response
(i.e., assuming that information set was the root). Each of
these sub-problems may be expressed in closed form us-
ing log-sum-exp and softmax functions. The sequence form
is recovered from behavioral strategies with a single down-
wards traversal of the tree. The precise details are contained
in the appendix.
Backward Pass The backward pass also requires solving
a linear system to obtain [yu yv yµ yν ]. We first begin by
making the crucial observation that the (necessary and suf-
ficient) KKT conditions of the following optimization prob-
lem is precisely the linear system in (8).
min
x
max
y
xTPy +
1
2
xTΞ(u)x− 1
2
yTΞ(v)y
+∇uLTx+∇vLT y
subject to Ex = 0 Fy = 0. (10)
Note that u and v are constants in the backwards pass,
here we are optimizing over x, y, which are not proba-
bilities. Since Ξ(u) and Ξ(v) are positive definite, this is
a convex-concave problem of the form required by Algo-
rithm 2. We select the natural distance generating function
Ψx =
1
2x
TΞ(u)x which yields (ignoring terms containing
only x¯),
Dx(x, x¯) =
1
2
xTΞ(u)x− xTΞ(u)x¯
Plugging this into the expression for BRx(x¯, y˜) and rear-
ranging gives
arg min
Ex=0
τ
1 + τ
xT (∇uL+ P y˜ − 1
τ
Ξ(u)x¯) +
1
2
xTΞ(u)x
(11)
Letting c = τ1+τ
(∇uL+ P y˜ − 1τ Ξ(u)x¯) in (16) gives the
KKT conditions
c+ ET γ + Ξ(u)x = 0, Ex = 0
where γ are Lagrange multipliers. Multiplying by EΞ−1(u)
gives a linear system in γ
EΞ−1(u)c+ EΞ−1ET γ = 0. (12)
After solving for γ, one may solve for x
x = Ξ−1(u)
(−c− ET γ) . (13)
Proposition 1. Solving for γ and x in Equations (12) and
(13) require linear time (in the size of the game tree).
The derivation involves exploiting the tree-structure in-
herent in extensive form games. Computational details and
proofs are deferred to the appendix.
5 Experiments
The proposed first order method was implemented using
Cython. We chose to do so since the best-response subrou-
tines require tree-traversals, which are expensive in Python.
while the second order method used the Numpy and Scipy
libraries for the solution of linear systems. Where possible,
we utilized the Scipy sparse matrix library. This was seen
to provide a significant speedup for sparse P for both our
method and Newton’s method. The PyTorch automatic dif-
ferentiation library (Paszke et al. 2017) was used to auto-
matically obtain gradients for components outside the game
solving module.
5.1 Synthetic datasets
Here we use randomly generated extensive form games to
illustrate the computational efficiency of our proposed first
order method compared to the second order method used
by Ling, Fang, and Kolter. We evaluate the solvers for the
forward and backward passes in isolation. The experiments
are run over several depths d. Normal form games have
d = 1. When d > 1, we adopt the following extensive
form game. players play d distinct simultaneous sub-games
in succession, where each simultaneous sub-game has nˆ ac-
tions. Transitions to the next sub-game is governed by the
joint action by both players, i.e., the size of P will be expo-
nential in d. The payoff matricesP were generated with each
non-zero entry uniformly chosen from [−10, 10], and ratio-
nality parameter λ for each information set uniformly and
independently chosen between [0.9, 1.1]. All timings pre-
sented are wall-clock timings. Experiments are run on the
cloud with identical Amazon EC2 instances. We set τ = 0.1
for all evaluations.
Evaluation of forward passes In the forward pass, we
compared the baseline Newton solver to our proposed first-
order method. However, the termination criterion for the 2
methods are non-identical; as Newton’s method minimizes
the residual rather than duality gap. To strike a fair compar-
ison, we evaluated the 2 methods by first running Newton’s
method till a residual of less than 10−3 is achieved. The du-
ality gap of that solution is computed and subsequently used
as the termination criterion for the FOM4. The timings and
speedup are averaged over 50 trials and presented in Fig-
ure 2.
Evaluation of backward passes In the backward pass, the
comparison for our proposed FOM is against solving the
linear system in (8) directly. In the loss function, we will
concern ourselves with the setting where the true matrix P
4On occasion, the Newton solver gave a gap extremely close
to numerical precision. In these cases, we apply to a termination
criterion of 10−12.
Figure 2: Timings (left) and speedup (right) for forward
passes. From top to bottom, d = 1, 2. Error bars represent
1 standard deviation. Dotted lines are optimal results given
the ground truth.
and λ parameters are used in computing u, v for the forward
pass. This corresponds to the case the model is already fairly
well trained. The results over 50 trials are presented in Fig-
ure 3. It is clear from both figures that our method scales
Figure 3: Timings (left) and speedup (right) for backward
passes. From top to bottom, d = 1, 2, 3. Error bars represent
1 standard deviation. Dotted lines are optimal results given
the ground truth.
much better than Newton’s method for randomly generated
matrices. Speedups of more than an order of magnitude are
fairly common, and the improvement increases with prob-
lem size. Furthermore, it was also observed that our method
consumed far less memory than sparse solvers. In fact, solv-
ing the sparse system when d = 3, nˆ = 17 (not plotted) re-
quired more than 10GB of memory. On the other hand, our
FOM was able to solve such instances in less than a minute,
and with no noticeable increase in memory usage. Note that
Figure 4: Left: log-loss and mse per epoch, Right: time re-
quired to obtain a particular log loss or mse. Dotted lines are
optimal results given the ground truth.
P contains more than 1.4 million rows and columns in this
setting.
5.2 One-Card Poker
Here we evaluate our method on the game of one card poker.
This multi-card extension of Kuhn poker contains most in-
teresting strategic elements of game playing (e.g., bluffing)
and was used by Ling, Fang, and Kolter to illustrate that it
is possible to learn distribution of cards in a deck just by ob-
servation player actions. However, the authors worked only
on tiny settings with just 4 cards – in sequence form, player
strategies may be represented in a 16 dimension vector. Fur-
thermore, the authors assumed that there were no varying
input features (i.e., the card distributions were identical for
each action observed). These assumptions enabled them to
achieve significant speedup by solving the game just once
in the forward pass, rather than once for each point in the
mini-batch. As we will see, their solver is too slow to be of
practical use in larger or featurized settings.
Here, we operate in a slightly different setting. Instead of
trying to learn underlying card distributions, we learn player
rationality parameters. We assume that player rationality is
independent of the cards being drawn, and only depends on
the past actions of (both) players. In this setting, there are
just 4 parameters to be learned. This is independent of the
size of the deck.
We generate our data assuming that player rationality is
some linear function of a scalar feature, i.e., there are 4
weights to be learned. The weight vector is drawn uniformly
from [0, 0.01]. Feature vectors are drawn between [0, 1]. Our
model is λh = wi×f+λ. The addition of a small λ ensures
that the λ’s will always remain positive; in our experiments,
λ = 0.001. For each feature, we compute the λ’s and find
its corresponding equilibrium from which we sample player
actions. The training set of size 2000, with an independent
test set of size 1000. We minimized the log loss using the
Adam optimizer with a batch size of 64 and learning rate of
10−4.
We compared our solver against Newton’s method, which
terminates at a residual of 10−8. We fixed τ = 1 for the
forward solver and τ = 0.1 for the backward solver. The
results are plotted in Figure 4.
In all 3 cases, both the log-loss is close to optimal given
around 30 epochs. As expected, our exacts solver exhibits
behavior almost identical to that of Newton’s method on a
per-epoch basis. Our solver is significantly faster than the
baseline. It was observed that at almost all stages of training,
Newton’s method took almost 2 orders of magnitude time
in order to learn a model of similar performance. In fact, a
single epoch using Newton’s method takes as much time as
training the entire model using our solver.
5.3 Information gathering dataset
Here we demonstrate the applicability of the nested logit
model (i.e., a one player game) using a publically available
dataset (Hunt et al. 2016). The game proceeds as follows.
Suppose there are 4 faced-down cards ranging from 1-10
placed in a 2×2 matrix (with potential repetitions). The goal
of the game is to select the row containing cards with the
largest sum. The game proceeds in 4 stages. At each stage
of the game, the player may make a guess prematurely, or
spend some points in revealing a new card. At the fourth and
final stage, the player has to make a guess. The player ob-
tains a reward of 60 and -50 points for correct and incorrect
guesses, and may only guess once. The challenge is for the
player to judge if it is worth paying to gather more infor-
mation. Computationally, the optimal policy may be easily
obtained using dynamic programming.
However, humans are rarely perfectly rational. We model
bounded rationality using the nested logit model. It is as-
sumed that the level of rationality should be a function of
a) how many cards are already open, and b) side informa-
tion such as one’s educational qualifications. This leads to
a natural description of the game with 4 different λ’s, each
of which is some function of features, which we describe
below.
Two models are trained for this experiment. NOFEAT
refers to the case when there are no features (i.e., we are
simply learning λ) and FEAT when we are exploiting de-
mographic information. In this case, features comprise the
player’s academic qualifications and age, both with one-hot
encodings. A player’s age is split into 8 age ranges, and ed-
ucation levels follow that of the UK (i.e., GCSE, A levels,
Undergraduate, Graduate). Our model employs a neural net-
work with 3 hidden layers of width 100, interspersed by rec-
tified linear activations. To ensure λ’s are positive, all inputs
were exponentiated before being fed into the solver. Figure 5
shows the log loss over the overall game as well as the loss
at each individual stage. For comparison, we also provide
the results for a player who picks a random action at every
stage of the game. The learned λ parameters for each config-
uration of features is presented in Figure 6. From Figure 5,
we can see that both trained models significantly outperform
UNIFORM. Log losses at each stage appear to decrease with
the stage number. This is unsurprising since players behave
more rationally (and hence predictably) as more information
is revealed. However, our model appears to perform worse at
stage 4, which is in fact a problem with full observability. We
loss loss(1) loss(2) loss(3) loss(4)
UNIFORM 1.833 1.099 1.099 1.099 0.693
NOFEAT 1.422 0.878 0.863 0.826 0.130
FEAT 1.419 0.874 0.866 0.818 0.145
Figure 5: Log losses for the information gathering dataset.
The first column shows losses over the whole game, other
columns show losses for individual stages.
Figure 6: Rationality parameters λ for each stage of the
game as a function of age and education. Stages are pre-
sented in row-major ordering. Note that ages are binned
within some range. All respondents below the age of 18 were
grouped together in a single age range.
suspect this higher loss is a consequence of our model ‘over-
fitting’ to be overly confident at the final stage, incurring a
huge loss on the rare occasion a player answers incorrectly.
Several trends are observed from Figure 6. First, notice
that λ decrease by approximately a factor of 10 between
stages. This is fairly expected, since each information gath-
ering leads to 10 other potential states. Also unsurprisingly,
better educated respondents exhibit more rationality (recall
a lower λ implies a more rational player). Interestingly, we
can see a U-shaped trend in all stages, suggesting that people
in the mid twenties and thirties are most rational. Both these
observations agree with the findings by (Hunt et al. 2016),
where it was shown that higher educated and middle aged
respondents obtained the most reward.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we substantially improve upon existing work
in differentiable game learning. We propose the NLQRE
which generalizes QRE and NL models. We also derive gra-
dients for backpropagation and learning, and develop solvers
which lead to speedups of several orders of magnitude. Fu-
ture work include the learning of game structure and exten-
sions for general-sum games.
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Appendix
Best response of the NLQRE as a nested logit
Here we show that the best-response in the NLQRE, which
may contain parallel information sets (either due to chance
or actions by other players) may be regarded as a nested
logit. The idea is to express each strategy in the reduced nor-
mal form into a sequence of decisions, each describing what
is to be done in each parallel information set.
Consider the following game in Figure 7. Chance (or the
other player), labelled as (2), first chooses out of 2 actions,
which is made known to the player. For example, this could
be the private cards which are dealt to a player in a game of
poker. The nodes T1 and T2 are the subtrees following these
2 actions by the chance player.
Figure 7: Full 2-player game tree. The first action is per-
formed by chance (or the other player). The player has to
provide for contingencies in both the red and blue trees.
Without loss of generality, let T ′1 and T
′
2 be the tree rep-
resentation of the player’s strategies in subgame T1 and T2,
i.e., T ′1 and T
′
2 are decision trees for the player. Given that
chance could have chosen either action to begin with, the
pure strategies are the cross product of all strategies between
T ′1 and T
′
2, i.e., the player has to account for all possible con-
tingencies. This may be written as a 2-stage decision process
in Figure 8, where the first and second stages are choices
from T ′1 and T
′
2 respectively, where T
′
2 is duplicated nleaves
times, where nleaves is the number of possible leaves for T ′1.
The rewards are additive in each stage, implying that the
best response for each of the duplicated trees are identical.
(Note however that the actual payoffs are modulated by the
probability of the chance player choosing the left or right
action, but this factor is identical for each copy of T ′2). Fur-
thermore, the leaves of T ′1 form a probability vector (since
T ′1 is a decision tree). This implies that setting the rationality
parameters for the roots of all copies T ′2 to be λ2 and the ra-
tionality parameter at T ′1 to be λ1 yields precisely one-player
version of the optimization problem in (2), since the objec-
tive in each copy of T ′2 is identical and their coefficients sum
to 1. Recursively applying this process bottom up to each
subtree (i.e., making duplicate copies of subtrees whenever
we encounter parallel information sets) gives the desired re-
sult.
Figure 8: Player’s decision tree. Red and blue components
are decision trees for the player. Each leaf (or path from the
root to a leaf) is a pure strategy in the reduced normal form
of the game in Figure 7.
Observe that each pure strategy (path) in Figure 8 is a pure
strategy in reduced normal form. However, each path may
pass through different information sets (for example, when
there is nesting of actions in the bus example), and hence
different λ parameters. This is in line with what one would
expect with nested logits.
Fast forward and backward pass solvers
In this section, we provide the complete computational de-
tails and proofs with regard of how to compute best re-
sponses for the forward and backward passes.
Forward Pass For this section, the u = x, v = y when
referring to Algorithm 2. Setting E(u),F(v) to be the en-
tropy terms in (2) and u0 = e, v0 = f gives the expression
in the form of (9). The natural divergence to be chosen is the
standard entropy divergence adapted to the dilated setting
(dropping terms in Du which do not contain u).
Ψu(u) = E(u) =
∑
h∈Iu
λh
∑
a∈Ah
ua log
ua
uph
Du(u, u¯) = Ψu(u)− uTΨ′u(u¯)
Ψ′u(u¯) = λρa −
∑
h′∈Ca
λh′ + λρa log
u¯a
u¯pa
where a similar expression holds forDv(v, v¯). Plugging into
the expression for BRu gives
BRu(u¯, v˜) = arg min
Eu=e
τ
1 + τ
uT (P v˜ + Ψ′u(u¯)) + E(u).
It is known that, BRu(u¯, v˜) may be solved by a single
bottom-up traversal of the game tree and a single sparse
matrix-vector multiplication (Hoda et al. 2010). At each in-
formation set , we solve for the ‘behavioral’ best response
(i.e., assuming that information set was the root). Each of
these sub-problems may be conveniently expressed using
log-sum-exp and softmax functions. Denoting cu = P v˜ +
Ψ′u(u¯), we compute
min
u,Eu=e
uT cu +
∑
h∈Iu
λhuph
∑
a∈Ah
ua
uph
log
(
ua
uph
)
,
where the constraint that u > 0 is implicit from the log bar-
rier.
Optimization of the inner summation, along with the rel-
evant part of the inner product may be done in closed form
using log-sum-exp. The tree constraints for u allows them to
perform traversals bottom up. Throughout the traversal pro-
cess, denote zh as the ‘value’ of each infoset h and ra as the
value of each action.
zh = λh log
∑
ρa=i
exp
(
ra
λh
) , ra = −ca + ∑
h∈C(a)
zh
The behavioral strategies uˆa may be expressed using the
softmax function. For an action a belonging to info set h,
uˆa =
exp(ra/λh)∑
a′∈Ch exp(ra′/λh)
(14)
The sequence form may be recovered from behavioral strate-
gies using a single downwards traversal of the tree.
Backward Pass The backward pass also requires solving
a linear system to obtain [yu yv yµ yν ]. By rewriting the
linear system as another min-max problem, we may again
apply Algorithm 2. Observe that the solution to the system
are precisely the (necessary and sufficient) KKT conditions
of the following min-max problem
min
x
max
y
xTPy +
1
2
xTΞ(u)x− 1
2
yTΞ(v)y
+∇uLTx+∇vLT y
subject to Ex = 0 Fy = 0. (15)
Note that u and v are constants in the backwards pass, here
we are optimizing over x, y, which are not probabilities.
Since Ξ(u) and Ξ(v) are positive definite, this is of the form
required by Algorithm 2. We select the natural distance gen-
erating function Ψx = 12x
TΞ(u)x which yields (ignoring
terms containing only x¯),
Dx(x, x¯) =
1
2
xTΞ(u)x− xTΞ(u)x¯
Plugging this into the expression for BRx(x¯, y˜) and rear-
ranging gives
arg min
Ex=0
τ
1 + τ
xT (∇uL+ P y˜ − 1
τ
Ξ(u)x¯) +
1
2
xTΞ(u)x
(16)
Proposition 1 Solving for γ and x in Equations (12) and
(13) require linear time (in the size of the game tree).
Proof. To obtain efficient solutions for the best responses,
we require the following handy results, which may all be
verified by algebraic manipulation.
Lemma 2. Ξ−1(u)ET =
[
α1, α2, . . . , α|Iu|
]
, where αi’s
are column vectors of size equal to number of actions, and
contain ua/λh’s where a is some descendent of information
set i, and 0 otherwise.
Taking transposes gives the following, EΞ−1(u) is equal
to
[
β1, . . . , β|Au|
]
, where the βa’s are column vectors of
length equal to |Iu|, and have entries equal to uaλh if the index
i is an ancestor of a.
Lemma 3. EΞ−1(u)ET = diag({uph}), i.e. equal to a
square matrix of size |Iu|, with diagonal entries equal to the
uph
λh
corresponding to a given information state’s parent ac-
tion.
Lemma 4. For any vector c, EΞ−1(u)c may be computed
in linear time by traversing the tree bottom-up.
We are now ready to prove the main theorem. Letting c =
τ
1+τ
(∇uL+ P y˜ − 1τ Ξ(u)x¯) in (16) gives
BRx(x¯, y˜) = min
x,Ex=0
xT c+
1
2
xTΞ(u)x, (17)
which has KKT conditions
c+ ET γ + Ξ(u)x = 0 (18)
Ex = 0 (19)
Multiplying by EΞ−1(u) gives
EΞ−1(u)c+ EΞ−1ET γ = 0 (20)
Note that we should not have introduced new roots in do-
ing so, since these are linear systems and there is a unique
solution to γ both before and after the multiplication. Ap-
plying Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 gives an expression for γ.
Lemma 4, together with the fact that EΞ−1ET is diagonal
implies that γ may be solved for in linear time. The compu-
tation of c requires Py, which may be done in time linear in
the size of the extensive form game tree. In the extreme case,
the game could be a single-stage simultaneous move game,
resulting in P being dense. However, for typical EFGs, P
should be fairly sparse.
With γ, we may solve for x
x = Ξ−1(u)
(−c− ET γ) (21)
Since Ξ(u) is tree-structured, the inversion may be done in
linear time using Gaussian Elimination. Similarly,ET γ may
be computed in linear time because of sparsity in E. That is,
the number of non-zero elements in E is equal to the sum of
the number of actions over all information sets (recall that
each row inE has non-zero entries for the actions for a given
information set and its parent).
